![]() 222, 227 (1961) ("not the province of the court to so interpret language of statute that may be avoided"). 309, 315 (1984) ("when statute appears not to provide for an eventuality, there is no justification for judicial legislation") Milton v. ven if an injustice or hardship were to result, this court cannot insert words into a statute, where, as here, the language of the statute, taken as a whole, is clear and unambiguous." Bronstein v. We cannot interpret a statute so as to avoid injustice or hardship if its language is clear and unambiguous and requires a different construction." Rosenbloom v. 30 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights. "The scope of the authority of this court to interpret and apply statutes is limited by its constitutional role as a judicial, rather than a legislative, body. The Appeals Court suggested that, although the lien statute in question was silent as to attorney's fees and costs, the lienholder might be required to pay a share of the fees and costs on equitable grounds. In that case, the division of medical assistance had asserted a lien against the plaintiff for medical benefits, later recovered from a third-party tortfeasor. The plaintiff relies on dicta in Whelan v. The plaintiff urges that we uphold the judge's conclusion that equity allows for the deduction of attorney's fees and costs from a medical lien. Pursuant to their agreement, the plaintiffs and the tortfeasor then stipulated to a dismissal of the underlying tort claim. ![]() HPHC unsuccessfully filed a motion for reconsideration. The judge ordered HPHC to pay the plaintiffs' counsel one-third of its recovery, reasoning that equity required that HPHC pay the standard contingency fee associated with this type of claim. 70A-70D, and under the subrogation clause of the subscriber agreement. " HPHC opposed the motion, arguing it was entitled to enforce the lien under G. ![]() The plaintiff sought to "compromise the amount of the lien and order to pay a proportional share of attorney's fees and costs in underlying tort action. The plaintiff then filed a motion in the Superior Court to determine the amount that she was required to pay HPHC under the lien. Before trial, the plaintiff and the tortfeasor agreed to a settlement. In May, 1997, HPHC perfected a hen against the plaintiff for the medical expenses it had paid, pursuant to the medical lien statute. In September, 1996, the plaintiff and her husband commenced a claim against the tortfeasor for personal injuries. Pursuant to a subscriber agreement between HPHC and the plaintiff, HPHC paid the plaintiff's medical expenses, totaling $10,165.79. The plaintiff was treated at South Shore Hospital. In August, 1995, the plaintiff was injured on the premises of Christmas Tree Shops, Inc. We allowed HPHC's application for direct appellate review. A Superior Court judge ordered HPHC to contribute to the plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs in the underlying tort action against the tortfeasor, the settlement of which allowed HPHC to enforce its lien. 70A-70B (medical lien statute), may be ordered to contribute to the attorney's fees and costs incurred by the plaintiff Donna D. At issue is whether Harvard Pilgrim Health Care of New England (HPHC), a lienholder under G. Healy with him) for Massachusetts Academy of Trial Attorneys & another, amici curiae, submitted a brief.ĪBRAMS, J. Schreckinger with him) for Harvard Pilgrim Health Care of New England. The Supreme Judicial Court granted an application for direct appellate review. ĬIVIL ACTION commenced in the Superior Court Department on September 27, 1996. 70A-70B, the medical lien statute, may not be ordered to contribute to the attorney's fees and costs incurred by an injured party in an action against the tortfeasor, where the lien statute makes no provision for such payment. 91 JanuMaNorfolk County Present: ABRAMS, LYNCH, GREANEY, FRIED, MARSHALL, & IRELAND, JJĪ lienholder under G. ![]() CHRISTMAS TREE SHOPS, INC., & another 429 Mass. ![]()
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